These reshaped perceptions will have the combined effect of revolutionizing the South Caucasus. Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkiye, and possibly Iran are all expected to streamline game-changing geo-economic corridors while Armenia will likely retreat further into self-imposed isolation. Yerevan could tap into the region’s coming bonanza by simply unblocking trade across its territory like it agreed to do in November 2020’s ceasefire, though this requires a truly multipolar government to implement.
The last Karabakh Conflict ended around 24 hours after it began once the self-professed regional “authorities” accepted a Russian-brokered ceasefire. The efforts of the Armenian Government, its US-based diaspora lobby, and their online supporters – many of whom hail from the Alt-Media Community (AMC) and became famous for opposing imperialism – to pressure America into declaring war against Azerbaijan on a Libyan-like pretext were all for naught. Stability has thus returned to the South Caucasus.
Although the fighting only lasted for a day, it’ll reshape all key players’ perceptions of one another. For starters, average Armenians feel – whether rightly or wrongly – that Prime Minister Pashinyan “betrayed” their country’s cause in Karabakh, which was always universally recognized as Azeri land. This could lead to more anti-government agitation that might in turn further destabilize his already insecure hold on power. A Color Revolution and/or military coup therefore can’t be ruled out.
Secondly, these same average Armenians are unlikely to be grateful to Russia for once again saving their occupying forces in Azerbaijan through the second ceasefire they brokered in three years due to the deluge of anti-Russian propaganda that they’ve been exposed to since Pashinyan came to power. Their ultra-nationalist French- and US-based diasporas have brainwashed them through “NGO” intelligence fronts into wrongly blaming Moscow for the failure of their imperial-revanchist project in Azerbaijan.
This concise fact-check here cites official sources from the Armenian Prime Minister, CSTO, and UN websites to prove that the Kremlin never had any obligation to protect those occupying forces there. Even so, years of fake news have regrettably convinced many that Russia is supposedly no longer a reliable military ally, hence why Armenia is expected to continue drifting westward no matter what. The third perception that’ll be impacted by this latest conflict is naturally Russia’s as was just explained.
Its policymakers saw how the last round of fighting was preceded by Pashinyan’s de facto pivot to the West and him publicly throwing their country under the bus in pursuit of that geopolitical goal. Yerevan ultimately failed to convince the West to militarily intervene in its support, which was always a political fantasy, but Moscow won’t forget what its nominal ally tried to do. The same goes for Russian perceptions of its global influence network, all agents of whom are now exposed as Western proxies.
Just like Russia was disappointed in the Armenian Government, its global influence network, and their online supporters, the fourth perception that was reshaped by the last conflict is Azerbaijan’s of the West. Baku had attempted to cultivate mutually beneficial ties with that New Cold War bloc for decades, only to have all those countries unite against it within hours. They condemned its anti-terrorist operation, demanded an immediate stop to it, and some even threatened sanctions.
Azerbaijan earlier assumed that they’d at least be neutral in the event that more fighting broke out since their country helped the West diversify from its previously disproportionate dependence on Russian energy over the past 18 months. This was a reasonable expectation since it was predicated on objective national interests, but it overlooked the extent to which Armenia’s agents of influence penetrated Western policymaking circles with their narratives about “defending values” and “preventing genocide”.
It was precisely because most Western policymakers are liberal–globalist ideologues that they sanctioned Russia in the first place despite that country having been its top energy supplier prior to February 2022, thus adding context to why they were so easily misled by Armenia’s aforesaid disinformation narratives. The end result was that the West once again risked sacrificing its objective national/energy interests in order to advance ideological ones, though the latest conflict ended before sanctions could be imposed.
Nevertheless, the West’s instantaneous rallying around Armenia and coordinated condemnation of Azerbaijan weren’t lost on Azeri policymakers nor on their Turkish allies. Both saw how swiftly that New Cold War bloc united in opposition to the anti-terrorist operation, which showed them that the West can never truly be relied upon. Accordingly, the fifth and final perception that’ll be affected by this latest conflict is that those two and Russia now realize that one another are more reliable than earlier thought.
Neither the Azerbaijani Government, its Western-based diaspora lobby, and its online supporters nor their Turkish equivalents ever agitated for America to declare war on Russia, not in the context of any of the three Karabakh Conflicts nor amidst the ongoing NATO-Russian proxy war. By contrast, the Armenian Government, its US-based diaspora, and their online supporters (including many in the AMC) waged a coordinated disinformation campaign that risked justifying a war with Russia by miscalculation.
This left a powerful impression on Russian policymakers that won’t be forgotten, just like their country’s official reaffirmation of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity during the last Karabakh Conflict left an equally powerful impression on Azeri and Turkish policymakers. It’s therefore expected that those three and possibly Iran, which is anti-Western to the core and had previously condemned Armenia’s joint drills with the US, will comprehensively expand cooperation and thus accelerate regional multipolar processes.
Taken together, these reshaped perceptions will have the combined effect of revolutionizing the South Caucasus. Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkiye, and possibly Iran are all expected to streamline game-changing geo-economic corridors while Armenia will likely retreat further into self-imposed isolation. Yerevan could tap into the region’s coming bonanza by simply unblocking trade across its territory like it agreed to do in November 2020’s ceasefire, though this requires a truly multipolar government to implement.
Therein lies the challenge, however, since the last three years’ events made average Armenians very susceptible to Western-concocted divide-and-rule narratives that weaponize ethnic, religious, and political differences to turn these people against their neighbors. It’ll therefore be extremely difficult for a truly multipolar government to rise in Armenia anytime soon since the continued presence of “NGO” foreign intelligence fronts and the shock of losing two wars in a row will keep resentment burning.
For that reason, it’ll probably be some time before Armenia votes a pragmatic politician into power who’ll then guide their country out of its self-imposed and Western-encouraged isolation, with the interim period (of presently indeterminate length) being characterized by further poverty and instability. Those Armenians who sincerely care for their compatriots and country should therefore take the lead in helping to positively reshape perceptions in the direction that’s required to reintegrate into the region.
