The real reason Egypt is arming Somalia

Somalia is turning into an open canvas for the longstanding Egypt-Ethiopia feud.

For long, the two countries bickered over whether the dam on the Blue Nile that Ethiopia was putting up should be controlled to ensure sufficient water reaches Cairo, but Ethiopia went on to fill the dam, forcing Cairo to quit any talks over the issue.

Now experts contend the Nile question is a factor but is not central to the recent events in Somalia, where Egypt has been delivering arms and strengthening cooperation with Mogadishu, much to the annoyance of Addis Ababa.

Ethiopia first touched off the spark of tensions with Somalia when it signed a controversial memorandum with Somaliland, the breakaway region in Somalia that has unsuccessfully sought to secede.

That pact has never been publicised, but both sides claimed it was meant to grant Ethiopia some coastal territory in Somaliland for a naval base in exchange for recognition of independence. Somalia has gone on to seek international support from whoever listens.

That MoU added to the Nile question, bringing together Ethiopia, Somalia and Egypt, each with its interests at stake.

Dr Rashid Abdi, an analyst on the Horn of Africa, argued that Egypt and Ethiopia have been on a collision course since last year, meaning the MoU was not the cause of the recent escalations

“In December, Egypt declared talks over GERD (Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam) ‘dead’. In January 2024, (it) formally withdrew from GERD talks. Somaliland MoU is not primary cause of current Horn tensions. It is simply a catalyst,” he wrote on X.

Some experts now see the general security of the Red Sea as a second water dispute that has attracted Egypt to Somalia.

According to the Horntalk, a bulletin by the Africa Policy Institute in collaboration with the Council on Kenya-Somalia Relations, a new lobby seeking to boost the ties between the two countries, three key factors are pushing Egypt into Somalia: Ethiopia’s search for sea access and how it could affect Egypt’s economic certainty in the Suez Canal, Cairo’s continued lobbying for allies in the Nile Basin and the Horn of Africa, and Somalia’s own vulnerability from weak institutions and the threat of violent extremists.

“Egypt has offered to boost the capacity of the army with weaponry. Egypt also brings in a new dynamic, that of sending troops and weaponry to Somalia without the traditional lamentations about who is funding or paying its soldiers. Somalia on its part is needy and has readily accepted these offers,” said the bulletin.

“These services, as we have seen, are not free lunch. Even if Mogadishu isn’t paying immediately for them, it may do in future. For now, the offers can help portray Egypt as a friend in need, help get back at Ethiopia for Somalia and hence build foundations that could be exploited in future.”

Somalia though isn’t in the Nile Basin. In the past, it backed dialogue to iron out the issue between Ethiopia and Egypt. But that debate on the Nile may now have closed, according to Prof Peter Kagwanja, CEO of the Africa Policy Institute, which brings in the question of the sea.

“The coastal stretch targeted by Ethiopia in Somaliland is at the mouth of the Red Sea. The Red Sea is an important economy tool for Egypt which gets its revenues by charging ships passing through the Suez Canal,” Prof Kagwanja told The EastAfrican.

“Egypt’s longterm concern is how Ethiopia’s naval base will affect the security of the Red Sea. But the Red Sea is a shared concern for other middle powers like Turkey,” he argued.

Middle powers are those countries with some influence over others, but lower than global powers such as the US and China. In Somalia, Turkey had been an influential ally, having arrived on the horizon at the time of drought in 2011 before cementing its military fingerprints on Somalia with a military base, a hospital and the largest embassy on African soil.

But Turkey and Egypt weren’t tight friends until last month when President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi visited Ankara, and they signed trade deals.

The coincidence in the renewal of friendship, and the Egyptians coming to Somalia, where they both have defence cooperation pacts, was telling.

Turkey, however, has tried to sustain alliances in both Ethiopia and Somalia.

This week, Turkish Foreign minister Hakan Fidan met separately with Ethiopia Foreign minister Taye Atske Selassie and Somalia’s Ahmed Moallim Fiqi at the Turkish House in New York, where he pledged to try mediating again.

“The Ankara Process continues, and we are decisive to work to find a balanced, viable and mutually beneficial solution to alleviate existing tensions,” Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted on X, referring to the first two rounds that didn’t produce results.

There are those who argue that analysing Egypt only based on its water needs may be insufficient.

Dr Adam Aw Hirsi, director of Foresight for Practical Solutions, a Mogadishu-based think-tank, said one important component in the equation is the history between Egypt and Somalia.

“Somalia and Egypt share a historic and cultural relationship that dates back to the successive reigns of the Pharaohs in Egypt. They are also members of the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation,” he told The EastAfrican.

“When Somalia and Ethiopia fought over the Ogaden in the 1970s and 1980s, Egypt stood by Somalia. Secondly, Somalia, Eritrea, Egypt, and to some extent Kenya form what I call the coalition of the threatened.

“Egypt faces threats from the drying up of the Nile, while Somalia, Eritrea and Kenya are at the risk of having their territories annexed.”

There is also Ethiopia’s perceived unilateral attempts on neighbour’s territories.

“Today, (Ethiopian Prime Minister) Dr Abiy Ahmed Ali has his sights set on Zayla. If not deterred, tomorrow it could be Asab, and the next day, possibly Mombasa.

The looming disaster could be averted in one of two ways: either the Ethiopian Prime Minister settles for the reality of what Ethiopia is now, rather than what he would like it to be, or all neighbouring countries and the international community join forces to make it clear to him that Africa’s colonial borders will remain as they are.”

Somalia itself learnt such a lesson in the past, he argued. Former leader Siad Barre once wanted to annex all Somali lands to be part of Somalia. He failed.

Abdirashid Ahmed Howlwadaag, a political observer in Mogadishu, said Egypt was only returning to an old ally but this time using the adage of “the enemy of your enemy is your friend.”

That is not to say Somalia and Ethiopia can go to war — yet. They have much at stake, including a common enemy in al-Shabaab.

Tarekegn Bululta, Ethiopia’s State Minister for Industry, argued the region’s problems, including combating terrorism and climate change, require cooperation but still Ethiopia is opposed to Egypt sending arms to Somalia, which has weak institutions to manage the flow of weapons.

“There is concern about the transfer of arms to unstable regions, with the fear that Egypt’s heavy weapons may end up in the hands of al-Shabaab,” he said.

“Such weapons could increase the group’s capabilities and pose a serious threat to the security of Somalia and beyond.”

One thing could change the dynamics, however. Hassan Aidarus, a commentator on Somalia politics, argues that the upcoming elections in Somaliland in November may upend the state’s desire to go ahead with the MoU with Addis. Besides, international pressure against the deal from key allies such the US and the UK may serve to slow it.

Additional reporting by Abdulkadir Khalif